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Abstract: This study explore the factors influencing 
mortgage loan default by using the data of mortgage 
default case from Jammu and Kashmir Bank. To 
achieve the study objectives sixteen variables are taken. 
The variables are categorized into three dimensions as 
borrower’s profile, loan value contents and collateral 
security. The tools used for analysis of data describing 
mortgage loan defaulter’s are chi-square, regression, 
ANOVA, and logistic regression through SPSS 18.0. 
The results indicate that the borrower’s gender, 
borrower’s age, borrower’s marital status, the 
borrower’s income, loan rate, loan type, loan amount, 
amount repaid, LTV, LTI, form of collateral security, 
Value of collateral security, purpose of loan and 
secondary finance on collateral security are significantly 
positively correlated with the defaulter’s outstanding 
loan amount. While as education qualification of 
borrower is significantly negatively correlated with 
defaulter’s outstanding loan amount. Logistic 
regression results indicate that income, secondary 
finance on collateral security and interest rate are 
mainly responsible for mortgage default.  
Keywords – Mortgage Default, Loan value contents, 
Collateral, LTV, LTI, Logistic regression. 
1. Introduction 
First, in this study, it is necessary to consider 
some fundamental aspects of the core ideas to be 
presented. Mortgage system of financial service in 
general, the mortgage loan market in India and 
mortgage default will be considered next for the first 
insights. 
Mortgage System of Financial Service - In the 
beginning, a mortgage was just a conveyance of land 
for a fee. The buyer paid the seller a set rate, with no 
interest, and the seller would sign over the land to the 
buyer. There were usually conditions to be met 
before the land to become property of the buyer, just 
as happens today, but usually it was based upon the 
assumption that the land would produce the money to 
be paid back to the seller. So, a mortgage was written 
due to this fact. The mortgage was kept in effect no 
matter the land was producing or not. This old 
arrangement was very lopsided once the seller of the 
property - or the lender who was holding the deed to 
the land - had absolute power over it and could do 
whatever he liked, including selling it, not allowing 
payment, refusing payoff, among other possibilities 
which caused major problems to the buyer, who held 
no ground at all. With time, and blatant abuse of the 
mortgage system, the courts began to uphold more of 
the buyers' rights, so that they had more to stand on 
when they came to become owners of their land. 
Eventually, they were allowed to demand the deed to 
be free and clear upon the payoff of the property. 
There were still several steps to be taken to ensure 
that the seller still had enough rights to keep his 
interest safe and make sure that his money would be 
paid. 
Although mortgages have changed from one 
form to another, but still the essentials of contract are 
same. Now, there are many more laws and 
regulations to help to protect the buyer, but also the 
seller and the creditor. There are also many different 
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to talk to mortgage broker about what the rates are 
now and what kinds of programs they offer to keep 
those interest rates low throughout the life of 
borrower’s loan. 
A mortgage is an agreement of security so that 
borrowers have to pay the debt. In many cases, the 
borrower will give up collateral security if he/she 
fails to repay the loan as agreed. Mortgage can be 
used as a verb, meaning “to pledge”. Mortgage and 
“home loan” are often used interchangeably. 
However, the mortgage is really the agreement that 
makes home loan to work. The bank would not lend 
the borrower hundreds of thousands of dollars unless 
the bank knew that it would be possible to claim 
collateral security in the event of mortgage default. A 
loan to finance the purchase of a real estate usually 
requires specified payment periods and interest rates. 
The borrower gives the lender (mortgagee) a 
lien on the property as collateral for the loan. 
Mortgage financing is an essential decision for 
both, borrowers and lenders. Not only this decision is 
qualitatively important, it is quantitatively significant, 
as well. The aggregate outstanding mortgage 
balances, and thus the capitalization of various 
mortgage related securities, is in the trillions. No 
wonder that the various aspects of mortgage 
contracting have been one of the most extensively 
researched topics in real estate finance and 
economics, both theoretically and empirically. 
Amongst these aspects, mortgage default has been 
one of the leading topics. Understanding mortgage 
default is necessary for appropriately valuing 
mortgages and for borrowers and lenders 
optimization. In most countries, a mortgage is the 
primary way that prospective homeowners have of 
buying a house, flat or land on which to build a 
property, collectively called real estate. This type of 
mortgage is called a residential mortgage or home 
loan. They are most often taken up by individuals or 
couples. 
A mortgage loan is a loan secured by real 
property through the use of a mortgage note which 
evidences the existence of the loan and the 
encumbrance of that realty through the granting of a 
mortgage which secures the loan. However, the word 
mortgage alone, in everyday usage, is most often 
used to mean mortgage loan. A home buyer or 
builder can obtain financing (a loan) either to 
purchase or to secure against the property from a 
financial institution, such as a bank, either directly or 
indirectly through intermediaries. Features of 
mortgage loans such as the size of the loan, maturity 
of the loan, interest rate, method of paying off the 
loan, and other characteristics can vary considerably. 
In many jurisdictions, though not all, it is normal 
for home purchases to be funded by a mortgage loan. 
Few individuals have enough savings or liquid funds 
to enable them to purchase property outright. In 
countries where the demand for home ownership is 
high, strong domestic markets have developed. The 
word mortgage is a French term meaning "dead 
pledge," apparently meaning that the pledge ends 
(dies) when either the obligation is fulfilled or the 
property is taken through foreclosure. 
Mortgage Loan Market: the Indian Scenario 
- Indian Mortgage Market is one of the largest 
divisions in the banking financial services and 
insurance sector. The India Mortgage Market was 
previously known as the Indian housing finance 
industry. At present the total worth of the India 
Mortgage Market is nearly US $ 18 billion. The gross 
domestic product to mortgage ratio in India is very 
low in comparison to other developed countries. The 
ratio in the foreign countries ranges from 25% to 
60% whereas in India the ratio is 2.5%. The India 
Mortgage Market is showing fast growth in the past 
few years. The foremost players in this sector are the 
finance corporation but presently the commercial 
banks are also starting to play an important role in the 
development and growth of the India Mortgage 
Market. At present the market leader in the India 
mortgage market is the Housing Development 
Finance Corporation (HDFC), with the State Bank of 
India (SBI) following the leader.  
Mortgage Default - The situation in which 
borrower is not making payments on his or her 
mortgage loan is called mortgage default and the loan 
is considered to be “in default,” meaning that the 
agency which holds the note can choose to take over 
the property. In finance, default occurs when a debtor 
has not met his or her legal obligations according to 
the debt contract, e.g. has not made a scheduled 
payment, or has violated a condition of the debt 
contract. A default is the failure to pay back a 
loan. Default may occur if the debtor is either 
unwilling or unable to pay his or her debt. This can 
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occur with all debt obligations including bonds, 
mortgages, loans, and promissory notes. 
The term default must be distinguished from the 
terms insolvency and bankruptcy. Default essentially 
means a debtor is not repaying the debt which he or 
she is required to have to pay. Insolvency means that 
debtor does not have ability to repay the debt and 
Bankruptcy is a legal finding that imposes court 
supervision over the financial affairs of those who are 
insolvent or in default. 
Default can be of three types:  
1. Technical default, 
2. Strategic default, 
3. Debt services default.  
Technical default occurs when an affirmative or 
a negative covenant is violated. Affirmative 
covenants are clauses in debt contracts that require 
firms to maintain certain levels of capital or financial 
ratios. The most commonly violated restrictions in 
affirmative covenants are tangible net worth, working 
capital /short term liquidity, and debt service 
coverage. Negative covenants are clauses in debt 
contracts that limit or prohibit corporate actions e.g. 
sale of assets, payment of dividends, that could 
impair the position of creditors. Negative covenants 
may be continuous or incurrence-based. Violations of 
negative covenants are rare compared to violations of 
affirmative covenants. 
When a debtor chooses to default on a loan, 
despite being able to make payments, this is said to 
be a strategic default. This is most commonly done 
for non-recourse loans, where the creditor cannot 
make other claims on the debtor; a common example 
is a situation of negative equity on mortgage loan in 
common law jurisdictions such as in the United 
States, which is in general “non-recourse”. In this 
case, default is colloquially called “jingle mail”, the 
debtor stops making payments and mails the keys to 
the creditor, generally a bank. 
When the borrower has not repaid the interest or 
principal which he/she was supposed to repay, it is 
called debt service default. Defaulting on a mortgage 
can result in the loss of a collateral security and 
accordingly it must be avoided. Even if the collateral 
security is not lost to the bank, a mortgage default 
will drag down a credit score significantly, making it 
harder to negotiate with the bank or to secure credit 
for other loans in the future. When a mortgage loan is 
issued, a monthly due date for payments is usually 
specified. Many mortgages include a grace period of 
from one to two weeks, meaning that payments sent 
during the grace period will still be considered on 
time. After the grace period has elapsed, however, 
late fees will start to be levied. If more than 30 days 
after the due date go by, the mortgage is considered 
to be in default. Once the bank determines that the 30 
days have elapsed, it sends a notice of mortgage 
default to a credit agency, impacting the credit score 
immediately. Within weeks, the bank will usually 
retain the services of a credit collection agency in an 
attempt to get the homeowner's past due payments. 
This adds to the fees associated with mortgage 
default. Many banks will also insist on a full payment 
including late fees and collection fees to bring the 
homeowner current, and they will not accept partial 
mortgage payments when the mortgage is in default. 
Within 60 to 90 days of the determination that the 
mortgage has defaulted, the bank will send a notice 
of mortgage default to the homeowner. This is the 
first step in foreclosure proceedings, giving the 
property owner a chance to make up the missed 
payments immediately and in full, or to risk having 
the collateral security taken over by the bank and sold 
at auction. The bank will also be obliged to post a 
public notice about the foreclosure, and the property 
owner will have a chance to buy the property back 
during the foreclosure auction, if he or she can 
muster up the funds in cash. Some people choose to 
default on their mortgages and simply walk away, 
deciding that the negative impact on their credit 
scores is better than sinking any more equity into the 
home. This is most common in areas where property 
values have declined radically, leaving people with 
loans which are larger than their homes are worth. 
Other people may try to sell their homes before their 
mortgages go into default so that they can wipe the 
slate and start over again. 
For homeowners who think that they may be 
risking mortgage default, the best thing to do is to 
talk to the lender. Ignoring payment notices, phone 
calls, and legal notices is not advisable, because the 
bank will refuse to negotiate with property owners 
who have not been proactive. Immediately as a 
property owner, he thinks that a mortgage payment 
will be missed, he or she shall contact the lender to 
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negotiate. Many lenders are willing to offer a longer 
grace period, or to permit reduced payments due to 
financial hardship to avoid mortgage default, as the 
bank would rather not deal with the hassle of a 
foreclosure auction. A history of paying on time and 
handling the mortgage responsibly will make the 
bank more likely to cooperate. 
2. Review of Literature 
This section deals with the dependent and 
independent variables and deals with other category 
of mortgage outstanding amount and related 
parameters of the study. The variables in this section 
are age, marital status, gender, educational 
qualification, monthly income, value of collateral 
security, purpose of loan, loan amount, mortgage 
outstanding balance, interest rate, loan type, type of 
collateral security, unemployment, loan-to-value ratio 
(LTV) and loan-to-income ratio (LTI). The studies 
involving mortgage loan have been reviewed and 
description of all variables are presented.  
2.1 The age of the borrower 
Capozza et al. (1997) indicated that the 
borrower’s age was negatively correlated with the 
default probability. Hakim and Haddad (1999) 
studied the influences of the borrower’s attributes and 
the loan characteristics on the mortgage loan default 
using a failure-time model. Their results indicated 
that the age of the borrower is significantly 
negatively correlated with the default probability. 
Jacobson and Roszbach (2003) indicated the 
applicant’s age was significantly negatively 
correlated with the unsecured loan default. Cairney 
and Boyle (2004) showed that the age of the 
borrower was significantly negatively correlated with 
the default risk of credit loans. Von Furstenberg and 
Green (1974) and Avery et al. (2004) in their studies 
they have assessed local situational factors as factors 
of default risk. They found that inclusion of a 
situational factor like the age of the borrower 
improves the performance of the scoring models. 
Orla and Tudela (2005) found that persistence in 
mortgage payment problems was greater among 
households in which the head’s age was 35 years old 
, or over than it was among households headed by 
younger individuals. The younger households are 
more capable of getting out of problems than those 
aged 35 or over. Kumar (2010) found that there is no 
significance between the age of the borrower and 
mortgage defaults.  
2.2 Marital Status of borrower 
Von Furstenberg and Green (1974), Avery et al. 
(2004) in their studies they have assessed local 
situational factors as factors of default risk. They 
found that inclusion of situational factor like marital 
status of borrower improves the performance of the 
scoring models. Cairney and Boyle (2004) showed 
that the marital status (single, widowed, or divorced) 
was significantly positively correlated with the 
default risk of credit loans. 
2.3 Gender of borrower 
Jacobson and Roszbach (2003) indicated that the 
applicant’s gender was significantly negatively 
correlated with the unsecured loan default.  
2.4 Borrower’s Educational Qualification 
Liu and Lee (1997) presented that the 
borrower’s education degree was significantly 
negatively correlated with the mortgage loan default. 
Cairney and Boyle (2004) showed whether the 
education level was significantly negatively 
correlated with the default risk of credit loans. 
2.5 Monthly Income of Borrower 
Stansell  and  Millar  (1976), Vandell  (1978),  
Ingram  and  Frazier  (1982)  have  found  that 
payment-to-income ratio is positively correlated with 
the probability of default i.e. higher the payment to 
income ratio, greater is the default risk. Clauretie 
(1987) has also argued that other non-equity factor 
like sources of income play a larger role in affecting 
default levels. Capozza et al. (1997) indicated that the 
income was negatively correlated with the default 
probability. Hakim and Haddad (1999) studied that 
the disposable income was negatively correlated with 
the default probability. Jacobson and Roszbach 
(2003) indicated that the annual income from wages 
was significantly positively correlated with the 
unsecured loan default.  Cairney and Boyle (2004) 
showed that the borrower’s income was significantly 
negatively correlated with the default risk of credit 
loans. Har and Eng (2004) also showed that the 
income was negatively correlated with the mortgage 
loan default. Teo and Ong (2005) indicated that the 
income was positively correlated with the mortgage 
loan default.  
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2.6 Value of Collateral Security 
Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) used a simulation 
analysis to demonstrate several non-equity factors 
overshadowing the equity effect on default which 
explained about households with zero or negative 
equity did not default, while others with positive 
equity. Clauretie (1987) has also argued that other 
non-equity factor like property value played a large 
role in affecting default levels. The default imposes 
personal costs on borrowers that include limits on 
occupational and credit opportunities, social stigma 
and damage to reputation (Kau, Keenan and Kim, 
(1993) and Vandell and Thibodeau, (1985)). The 
costs exceed the absolute value of negative equity. 
The borrower will not default when Paul Bennett et 
al. (1997) found that the structural change in the 
mortgage market had increased homeowners’ 
propensity to refinance. Bajari et al. (2008) studied 
empirically the relative importance of the various 
drivers behind subprime borrower’s decision to 
default. They emphasize the role of the nationwide 
decrease in home prices as the main driver of default. 
Foote et al. (2008) examined homeowners in 
Massachusetts who had negative home equity during 
the early 1990s and found that fewer than 10% of 
these owners eventually lost their home to 
foreclosure.  
2.7 Type of Collateral Security 
Teo and Ong (2005) indicated that the collateral 
type was significantly positively correlated with the 
mortgage loan default. Yildiary Yildirium (2007) 
found that loans within the same geographical area 
and property type tend to exhibit correlation in 
default incidence.  
2.8 Purpose of Loan  
Lee (2002) has identified the ‘purpose of 
purchasing real estate property' is one of the key 
determinants of default risk. Therefore, when the 
market price of collateral falls sharply or economic 
performance becomes much worse, the property 
frequently is abandoned by the owners thereby 
limiting their loss. Har and Eng (2004) showed that 
the use purpose of collateral was negatively 
correlated with the mortgage loan default.  
2.9 Loan Amount 
Paul Bennett et al. (1997) found that loan size is 
negatively correlated with the mortgage defaults. 
Hakim and Haddad (1999) studied the influences of 
the borrower’s attributes and the loan characteristics 
on the mortgage loan default using failure-time 
model. Their results indicated that the loan amount 
was negatively correlated with the default 
probability. 
2.10 Interest Rate of loan amount 
borrowed 
Campbell and Dietrich (1983) showed that the 
interest rates significantly explain mortgage 
prepayment, delinquencies and defaults by using logit 
model. Har and Eng (2004) showed that the loan 
interest rate was significantly positively correlated 
with the mortgage loan default. Teo and Ong (2005) 
indicated that the interest rate was significantly 
negatively correlated with the mortgage loan default. 
Danny (2008) indicated that any empirical test of the 
relation between the LTV ratio and the default risk 
incorporated the interrelationship among the LTV 
ratio, credit score and interest rate.  
2.11 Loan Type 
Smith et al. (1996) found that the default 
probability was significantly affected by the loan 
type. 
2.12 Loan-to-value ratio (LTV) 
Campbell and Dietrich (1983) showed that the 
LTV ratio explain mortgage prepayment. Lawrence 
et al. (1992) stated that the default risk was positively 
correlated with the ratio of loan amount to collateral. 
Smith et al. (1996) found that the default probability 
was significantly affected by the loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratio. Liu and Lee (1997) presented that the LTV 
ratio were significantly positively correlated with the 
mortgage loan default. Capozza et al. (1997) 
indicated that the LTV ratio was an important factor 
affecting the mortgage loan default. Kau and Keenan 
(1998) treat the default as a rational decision and 
their research paper provides the entire distribution of 
defaults’ severity. The distributions of severity are 
both disperse and skewed. The severity distribution 
shifts more than in proportion to the rise in the loan 
to value (LTV) ratio. Further, the researchers have 
demonstrated that severity of default rises as the LTV 
ratio increases. According to empirical model, 
negative mortgage value motivates financial defaults.  
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The mortgage value is equity (the amount paid by the 
borrower from his savings to the developer apart 
from bank loan and some more investments in the 
house for furniture & fittings, registration cost, etc.), 
house value less mortgage balance, and the value of 
prepayment and default options imbedded in 
mortgage contract. Archer et al. (1999) option-based 
models of mortgage default posit that the central 
measure of default risk is the loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratio. Results show that the mortgages with low and 
moderate LTVs may be as likely to default as those 
with high LTVs.  Archer et al. (2001) argue that LTV 
at origination is an endogenous risk measure and 
therefore no empirical relationship between LTV and 
mortgage default should exist. Ambrose and Sanders 
(2001) use a competing risks model to examine 
default and prepayment behavior using 4,257 
commercial loans underlying 33 CMBS deals. They 
also found no statistical relationship between original 
LTV and default. In their model, however, no 
measure of property cash flow is included.  
Loan-to-income ratio (LTI) 
Campbell and Cocco (2010) showed that 
mortgage default is triggered by negative home 
equity, which results from declining house prices in a 
low inflation environment with large mortgage 
balances outstanding. The level of negative home 
equity that triggers default depends on the extent to 
which households are borrowing constrained. High 
loan-to-value ratios at mortgage origination increase 
the probability of negative home equity. High loan-
to-income (LTI) ratios also increase the probability of 
default by making borrowing constraints more 
severe. Interest-only mortgages trade of an increased 
probability of negative home equity against a 
relaxation of borrowing constraints. 
3. Research Methodology 
This section includes the statement of the 
problem, presents arguments for the need for the 
study, the objectives, data collection, sampling, 
statistical tools; proposition and the limitations of the 
study. The description of all these aspects of 
methodology follows. 
3.1 Statement of the Problem 
In changing economic conditions customers are 
not able to foresee their income and value of their 
own property. It is because of the existence of limited 
sources of information available to them. When the 
customer income and their property value decreases, 
it is likely to result in mortgage default. Companies 
try to maximize their returns in various means of 
charges on mortgage loan. The increased charges of 
banks lead to mortgage default. Mortgage default has 
an additional cost of transaction for both lender as 
well as borrower. The different factors which are 
responsible for mortgage default are payment 
records, the ratio of loan amount to collateral value 
and the ratio of the borrower’s income to expenditure 
(Lawrence et al. 1992), loan-to-value ratio, length of 
loan, the fluctuation rate of housing price, 
unemployment rate, divorce rate, and the borrower’ 
moving frequency (Capozza et al. 1997; Liu and Lee, 
1997) percentage of first loan, the loan interest rate, 
the floor area, and the borrower’s credit risk (Har and 
Eng, 2004) and whether the borrower’s house is 
owned by himself or rented, the marital status (single, 
widowed, or divorced), the degree of living pressure, 
and the borrower’s credit risk ( Cairney and Boyle, 
2004). In effect, the mortgage default is on the rise 
due to piling up of various reasons in personal risk, 
loan value and collateral security. 
3.2 Need for the Study 
In this study, researchers have attempted to 
evaluate three pronged approach of important 
dimensions which directly or indirectly affect 
mortgage default. The effect of borrowers’ profile, 
loan value and collateral security on mortgage default 
are studied. Therefore the present study is an effort to 
bring an understanding of the existing situation with 
respect to mortgage default. This study aims to 
evaluate the procedure that facilitates the existing 
mortgage loan borrowers and also in time with 
bank’s policy. Also the suggestions take care of 
customer in order to manage mortgage defaults.  
3.3 Objectives of the Study  
This work aims: 
1. To study the impact of borrower’s profile 
on mortgage default. 
2. To measure the association of borrower 
profile, loan value and realty of collateral 
security on mortgage defaulters’ 
outstanding balance. 
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3. To assess relationship of loan value, 
collateral security and outstanding balance.  
4. To find out the difference between the 
present market value of collateral security 
against outstanding balance of mortgage 
defaulters. 
5. To extrapolate the reason for mortgage 
default due to socio-economic variables, 
interest rate, loan schemes, use of loan, 
secondary finance, loan-to-value ratio and 
loan-to-income ratio. 
3.4 Research Design 
The study is a descriptive research about 
mortgage default. A mortgage default is a situation in 
which borrower is not making payment on his/her 
loan. The variables used in this study are categorized 
into three dimensions: borrower profile, loan value 
and collateral security. Borrower profile includes age, 
marital status, gender, educational qualification and 
income of borrower. Loan value includes loan 
amount, loan amount repaid, outstanding balance, 
interest rate, loan type, loan-to-value ratio (LTV), 
loan-to-income ratio (LTI) and purpose of loan. By 
its side collateral security includes value of security, 
type of security and secondary finance. 
 
3.5  Data Collection Design 
The whole study is based on extracted data 
collected from Jammu and Kashmir Bank ltd. from 
secondary sources maintained in bank but not 
published. The collected data is from those borrowers 
who have been declared as defaulters from April 
2011 up to March 2012. One of the researchers has 
spent twenty days in the bank in order to understand 
the problem in depth and to understand suitability 
and reliability of data. This researcher has recorded 
the data from the default borrower’s file. Details 
about all the variables for the whole sample size are 
collected. 
3.6  Sampling Design 
The systematic sampling methods have been 
adopted to select sample defaulters. The total number 
of defaulters was 578, out of which 115 is taken as 
sample. Every fifth borrower was chosen. Due to 
more variation of data from average value 15 cases of 
the sample were eliminated in order to maintain 
proper intervals. The study area is Jammu and 
Kashmir and sample unit is mortgage defaulters.  The 
study period spread from September 2011 to August 
2012. Sample size is calculated based upon the scale 
given by Aaker et al. (2009). Co-efficiency of 
variance for loan-to-value (LTV) has been computed 
for 30 cases as a pilot study. The computed value is 
0.19 and based on this value sample of 99 was taken.  
3.7  Statistical Design 
The researchers have adopted relevant statistical 
tools for analysis of data describing mortgage loan 
defaulters. The following are the relevant tools used 
for analysis of data viz., chi-square, correlation, 
regression, ANOVA, paired ‘t’ test and logistic 
regression have been selected for the proper of 
analysis of data. SPSS 17.0 is used for the analysis of 
all the above statistical tools and tabulation of 
processed data.  
3.8 Propositions 
P1: Average amount of default loan is not 
varying with the loan value, property market 
value directly and the collateral security, 
secondary finance, socio-economic 
variables, marital status, gender and age of 
both commercial and residential borrowers 
indirectly. 
P2: The amount of default loan is not 
significantly associated with the loan value, 
property market value directly and the 
collateral security, secondary finance, 
socio-economic variables, marital status, 
gender and age of both commercial and 
residential borrowers indirectly. 
P3: The amount of default loan has no linear 
relationship with the loan value, property 
market value directly and the collateral 
security, secondary finance, socio-economic 
variables, marital status, gender and age of 
both commercial and residential borrowers 
indirectly. 
 
3.9 Limitations of the Study 
Bank kept some of borrower’s information 
confidential. The confidential data maintained by 
banks, especially contact details were not provided to 
the researchers. The area of borrower was not 
available for research and therefore it was difficult to 
denote the geographic location where there was loan 
default. Researchers want to study as much data as 
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possible in order to identify replication of results. 
This was not supported for completion. Electronic 
softcopy of data was sought by researcher, but it was 
not permitted to him. The crosscheck of data 
collection was done by the researcher and not by the 
bank.  
4. Analysis and Interpretation 
The dimensions viz. borrowers profile, loan 
value contents and characteristics of collateral 
security have been tested for relationship with 
borrowers outstanding loan balance by applying 
correlation test. 
4.1 Correlation Analysis 
Correlation test between borrower’s profile and 
outstanding balance 
The borrower profile consists of five variables 
as age, gender, marital status, educational 
qualification and monthly income of borrower. 
Correlation method had been applied to find out the 
relationship between borrower’s profile variables and 
defaulters outstanding balance. The description of 
correlation results for each pair is given as follows. 
The value of correlation co-efficient between 
outstanding balance and the age of the borrower 
“r”=0.308 indicates that 30.8% of the variation in 
outstanding balance is explained by the age of the 
borrower. And p value is <0.01 so, there exists a 
positive relationship between the outstanding balance 
and age at 99% level of confidence. The value of 
correlation co-efficient between outstanding balance 
and educational qualification of borrower “r”=-0.088 
indicates that 8.8% of the variation in outstanding 
balance is explained by the age of the borrower. And 
p value is >0.05 so, there exists a very weak 
relationship between the outstanding balance and 
educational qualification at 95% level of confidence. 
The value of correlation co-efficient between 
outstanding balance and gender of borrower 
“r”=0.196 indicates that 19.6% of the variation in 
outstanding balance is explained by the age of the 
borrower. And p value is >0.05 so, there exists a very 
weak relationship between the outstanding balance 
and gender at 95% level of confidence. The value of 
correlation co-efficient between outstanding balance 
and marital status “r”=0.385 indicates that 38.5% of 
the variation in outstanding balance is explained by 
the marital status of the borrower. And p value is 
<0.01 so, there exists a positive relationship between 
the outstanding balance and marital status of 
borrower at 99% level of confidence. The value of 
correlation co-efficient between outstanding balance 
and monthly income “r”=0.539 indicates that 53.9% 
of the variation in outstanding balance is explained 
by the monthly income of the borrower. And p value 
is <0.01 so, there exists a positive relationship 
between the outstanding balance and monthly income 
of borrower at 99% level of confidence. (Table 1) 
Correlation test between loan contents and 
outstanding balance 
The loan content dimension consists of four 
variables as loan amount, amount repaid, loan-to-
value ratio and loan-to-income ratio. Correlation 
method had been applied to find out the relationship 
between loan content variables and defaulters 
outstanding balance. The description of correlation 
results for each pair is given as follows. 
The value of correlation co-efficient between 
outstanding balance and interest rate “r”=0.424 
indicates that 42.4% of the variation in outstanding 
balance is explained by interest rate. And p value is 
<0.01 so, there exists a positive relationship between 
the outstanding balance and interest rate at 99% level 
of confidence. The value of correlation co-efficient 
between outstanding balance and type of loan “r”=-
0.155 indicates that 15.5% of the variation in 
outstanding balance is explained by the type of the 
loan. And p value is >0.05 so, there exists a very 
weak negative relationship between the outstanding 
balance and type of loan at 95% level of confidence. 
The value of correlation co-efficient between 
outstanding balance and loan amount “r”=0.847 
indicates that 84.7% of the variation in outstanding 
balance is explained by the loan amount. And p value 
is <0.01 so, there exists a positive relationship 
between the outstanding balance and loan amount at 
99% level of confidence. The value of correlation co-
efficient between outstanding balance and loan 
amount repaid “r”=0.036 indicates that 3.6% of the 
variation in outstanding balance is explained by the 
loan amount repaid. And p value is >0.05 so, there 
exists very weak relationship between the 
outstanding balance and loan amount repaid at 95% 
level of confidence. The value of correlation co-
efficient between outstanding balance and loan-to-
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value ratio “r”=0.557 indicates that 55.7% of the 
variation in outstanding balance is explained by loan-
to-value ratio. And p value is <0.01 so, there exists a 
positive relationship between the outstanding balance 
and loan-to-value ratio at 99% level of confidence. 
The value of correlation co-efficient between 
outstanding balance and loan-to-income ratio 
“r”=0.371 indicates that 37.1% of the variation in 
outstanding balance is explained by loan-to-income 
ratio. And p value is <0.01 so, there exists a positive 
relationship between the outstanding balance and 
loan-to-income ratio at 99% level of confidence. 
(Table 2) 
Correlation test between outstanding balance and 
collateral security characteristics 
The collateral security characteristics consist of 
three variables as form of security, value of security 
and secondary finance. Correlation method had been 
applied to find out the relationship between collateral 
security variables and defaulters outstanding balance. 
The description of correlation results for each pair is 
given as follows. 
The value of correlation co-efficient between 
outstanding balance and type of security “r”=0.209 
indicates that 20.9% of the variation in outstanding 
balance is explained by type of security. And p value 
is <0.05 so, there exists a positive relationship 
between the outstanding balance and type of security 
at 95% level of confidence. The value of correlation 
co-efficient between outstanding balance and value 
of property “r”=0.602 indicates that 60.2% of the 
variation in outstanding balance is explained by value 
of property. And p value is <0.01 so, there exists a 
strong positive relationship between the outstanding 
balance and value of property at 99% level of 
confidence. The value of correlation co-efficient 
between outstanding balance and secondary finance 
“r”=0.099 indicates that 9.9% of the variation in 
outstanding balance is explained by secondary 
finance. And p value is >0.05 so, there exists a very 
weak relationship between the outstanding balance 
and secondary finance at 95% level of confidence. 
The value of correlation co-efficient between 
outstanding balance and use of loan “r”=0.048 
indicates that 4.8% of the variation in outstanding 
balance is explained by use of loan. And p value is 
>0.05 so, there exists a very weak relationship 
between the outstanding balance and use of loan at 
95% level of confidence. (Table 3) 
4.2  ANOVA Analysis 
The variables viz. income, loan amount, LTV, 
value of collateral security and loan amount repaid 
has been tested for equality of mean with borrower’s 
outstanding balance by applying ANOVA. 
Outstanding Loan Balance Based on Monthly 
Income 
Mean and S.D. based on outstanding loan 
balance and monthly income have been studied.  The 
results of ANOVA tabulation (table 4) consist of two 
categories of outstanding loan balance 4-44lacs and 
44-84lacs. The result of the study shows that there is 
a significant difference in the mean score for 
outstanding loan balance for different categories of 
borrower based on monthly income. In order to test 
the group variation in mean scores, a null hypothesis 
was proposed.  
HO: Means of outstanding loan balance is not 
significantly influenced by monthly income.  
HA: Means of outstanding loan balance is 
significantly influenced by monthly income. 
In order to test the hypothesis, ANOVA test has 
been applied (Table 5). It has been found that F value 
is 34.536 and the ‘p’ value for the level of 
significance is 0.000.  As the ‘p’ value is less than 
0.01, it indicates that alternative hypothesis is 
accepted as outstanding loan balance is significantly 
influenced by monthly income at 99% level of 
confidence. 
Outstanding Loan Balance Based on Loan 
Amount 
Mean and S.D based on outstanding loan 
balance and loan amount have been studied.  The 
results of ANOVA tabulation (table 4) consist of two 
categories of outstanding loan balance 4-44lacs and 
44-84lacs. The result of the study shows that there is 
a significant difference in the mean score for 
outstanding loan balance for different categories of 
borrower based on loan amount. In order to test the 
group variation in mean scores, a null hypothesis was 
proposed.  
HO: Means of outstanding loan balance is not 
significantly influenced by loan amount.  
HA: Means of outstanding loan balance is 
significantly influenced by loan amount. 
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In order to test the hypothesis, ANOVA test has 
been applied (Table 5). It has been found that F value 
is 65.503 and the ‘p’ value for the level of 
significance is 0.000.  As the ‘p’ value is less than 
0.01, it indicates that alternative hypothesis is 
accepted as outstanding loan balance is significantly 
influenced by loan amount at 99% level of 
confidence. 
Outstanding Loan Balance Based on Loan 
Amount Repaid 
 Mean and S.D based on outstanding loan 
balance and loan amount repaid have been studied.  
The results of ANOVA tabulation (table 4) consist of 
two categories of outstanding loan balance 4-44lacs 
and 44-84lacs. The result of the study shows that 
there is a significant difference in the mean score for 
outstanding loan balance for different categories of 
borrower based on loan amount repaid. In order to 
test the group variation in mean scores, a null 
hypothesis was proposed.  
HO: Means of outstanding loan balance is not 
significantly influenced by loan amount repaid.  
HA: Means of outstanding loan balance is 
significantly influenced by loan amount repaid. 
In order to test the hypothesis, ANOVA test has 
been applied (Table 5). It has been found that F value 
is 0.039 and the ‘p’ value for the level of significance 
is 0.844.  As the ‘p’ value is greater than 0.05, it 
indicates that null hypothesis is accepted as 
outstanding loan balance is not significantly 
influenced by loan amount repaid at 95% level of 
confidence. 
Outstanding Loan Balance Based on Value of 
Security 
 Mean and S.D based on outstanding loan 
balance and value of security have been studied.  The 
results of ANOVA tabulation (table 4) consist of two 
categories of outstanding loan balance 4-44lacs and 
44-84lacs. The result of the study shows that there is 
a significant difference in the mean score for 
outstanding loan balance for different categories of 
borrower based on value of security. In order to test 
the group variation in mean scores, a null hypothesis 
was proposed.  
HO: Means of outstanding loan balance is not 
significantly influenced by value of security.  
HA: Means of outstanding loan balance is 
significantly influenced by value of security. 
In order to test the hypothesis, ANOVA test has 
been applied (Table 5). It has been found that F value 
is 41.374 and the ‘p’ value for the level of 
significance is 0.000.  As the ‘p’ value is less than 
0.01, it indicates that alternative hypothesis is 
accepted as outstanding loan balance is significantly 
influenced by value of security at 99% level of 
confidence. 
Outstanding Loan Balance Based on Loan-to-
Value Ratio (LTV) 
 Mean and S.D based on outstanding loan 
balance and LTV have been studied.  The results of 
ANOVA tabulation (table 4) consist of two 
categories of outstanding loan balance 4-44lacs and 
44-84lacs. The result of the study shows that there is 
a significant difference in the mean score for 
outstanding loan balance for different categories of 
borrower based on LTV. In order to test the group 
variation in mean scores, a null hypothesis was 
proposed.  
HO: Means of outstanding loan balance is not 
significantly influenced by LTV.  
HA: Means of outstanding loan balance is 
significantly influenced by LTV. 
In order to test the hypothesis, ANOVA test has 
been applied (Table 5). It has been found that F value 
is 13.471 and the ‘p’ value for the level of 
significance is 0.000.  As the ‘p’ value is less than 
0.01, it indicates that alternative hypothesis is 
accepted as outstanding loan balance is significantly 
influenced by LTV at 99% level of confidence. 
4.3 Logistic Regression 
Strength of relationship between outstanding 
balance with age, income, educational qualification, 
LTV, interest rate, purpose of loan and secondary 
finance has been studied.  
Accuracy is measured as correctly classified 
records in the holdout sample. There are four possible 
classifications: 
1. Prediction of 0 when the holdout sample has 
a 0 (True Negative/TN) 
2. Prediction of 0 when the holdout sample has 
a 1 (False Negative/FN) 
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3. Prediction of 1 when the holdout sample has 
a 0 (False Positive/FP) 
4. Prediction of 1 when the holdout sample has 
a 1 (True Positive/TP) 
Precision and recall is calculated as (Table 7) 
Precision=tp/(tp+fp)        
Precision=49/ (49+5) =0.908 
Recall=tp/(tp+fn) 
Recall=49/ (49+10) =0.830 
The percent of correctly classified observations 
in the holdout sample is referred to the assessed 
model accuracy. Additional accuracy can be 
expressed as the model's ability to correctly classify 
0, or the ability to correctly classify 1 in the holdout 
dataset.  
The regression model is given as: (Table 8) 
Outstanding balance= 0.258 - 0.91*age - 
4.895*Income + 2.618*LTV + Edu*0.377 - 
2.405*Interest Rate - 0.915*Loan Amount + 
0.684*Purpose of loan + 3.601*Secondary Finance. 
The R square value is 0.643, (Table 6(a)) which 
means that 64.3% of variation in outstanding balance 
is due to the variation of LTV, LTI, Income, Loan 
amount, Interest rate, age, educational qualification, 
purpose of loan and secondary finance. The precision 
of the model is 90.8% and its recall percentage is 
83%. The level of significance from table 8 shows 
that Income (0.000), LTV (0.051) and Secondary 
finance (0.026) are mainly responsible for mortgage 
default. 
The ROC curves (figure 1 & 2) have been drawn 
for the outstanding balance above and below the 
average with age, income, LTV, LTI, educational 
qualification, interest rate, loan amount, purpose of 
loan and secondary finance on collateral security. 
The results shows that the age of the borrower, 
income of borrower and interest rate are the main 
factors responsible for mortgage default (Table 8).  






5.1 Impact of borrower profile on Mortgage 
Loan 
Relationship between outstanding balance 
and borrower’s profile 
The correlation result shows that outstanding 
balance has positive relationship with age, which is 
against the results of Jacobson and Roszbach (2003). 
The correlation result shows that outstanding balance 
has positive relationship with marital status which is 
supported by of Cairney and Boyle (2004). The 
correlation result shows that outstanding balance has 
positive relationship with income which is supported 
by Jacobson and Roszbach (2003). The correlation 
result shows that outstanding balance has positive 
relationship with gender which is against the results 
of Jacobson and Roszbach (2003). While as 
educational qualification is negatively correlated with 
outstanding balance which are in line with the results 
of Liu and Lee (1997), Cairney and Boyle (2004). 
5.2 Impact of Loan Value Contents on 
Mortgage Default 
The interest rate shows that higher the interest 
rate more the defaults. The defaults according to loan 
scheme are dominated by those borrowers who have 
opted for term loan. Loan amount borrowed shows 
that higher loan amount have less defaults compared 
to the lower loan amounts. Loan amount repaid is 
dominated by 0-15lacs group. 
Relationship between outstanding balance 
and loan value contents 
Correlation between loan value contents and 
outstanding balance has been studied. The correlation 
result shows that outstanding balance has positive 
relationship with loan amount which is against the 
results of Hakim and Haddad (1999). The correlation 
result shows that outstanding balance has positive 
relationship with loan amount which is supported by 
the study made by Lawrence et al. (1992). The 
correlation result shows that outstanding balance has 
positive relationship with LTI which is supported by 
the results of Campbell and Cocco (2010). The 
correlation result shows that outstanding balance has 
positive relationship with loan amount repaid. 
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Influence of monthly income, loan amount, 
LTV, value of security and loan amount repaid on 
mean of outstanding balance amount-ANOVA  
Mean and S.D based on outstanding balance and 
monthly income, loan amount, LTV, loan amount 
repaid and value of security has been studied. The 
results show that mean of outstanding balance is 
significantly influenced by monthly income, loan 
amount, LTV and Value of security. While as mean 
of outstanding balance is not significantly influenced 
by loan amount repaid.                  
5.3 Impact of characteristics of collateral 
security on mortgage default 
 The value of security shows lower the value 
of property higher the defaults and vice versa. LTV 
ratio shows that 78% of defaults have LTV value 
between 0.51-0.75. LTI ratio is dominated by 0.26-
0.5 group. The form of security shows that those who 
has kept “land” as security defaults more. ‘Purpose of 
loan’ shows that 48% of defaulters have used loan for 
business investment. Secondary finance variable 
shows that 87% of defaulters have not opted for 
secondary finance.  
Relationship between outstanding balance 
and characteristics of collateral security 
Correlation between characteristics of collateral 
security and outstanding balance has been studied. 
The correlation result shows that outstanding balance 
has positive relationship with value of security which 
is supported by the results of Clauretie (1987). The 
correlation result shows that outstanding balance has 
positive relationship with form of collateral security 
which is supported by the results of Teo and Ong 
(2005). The correlation result shows that outstanding 
balance has positive relationship with secondary 
finance. 
  
Logistic Regression findings 
Logistic regression results shows that Income, 
LTV and secondary finance are mainly responsible 
for mortgage default. While as ROC curves show 
Age, Income and Interest rate are responsible for 
mortgage default. In both the cases Income has been 
the factor of loan default. 
6. Suggestions 
The study is about mortgage default and the 
researcher is intending to propose the following 
suggestions in order to manage mortgage loan 
accounts in an effective way. 
1. There is need for effective evaluation of 
borrowers profile especially age, marital status 
and monthly income. Lesser loan amount 
should be sanctioned to married people with 
age group of 37-47years and income level of 
66-116k. 
2. Loan value contents mainly LTV, LTI & 
interest rate and Characteristics of collateral 
security especially value of security and form 
of security land have direct effect on 
outstanding balance and should be taken care 
of, at the time of loan agreement. The LTV 
and LTI ratio should be kept below 0.5 and 
0.25 respectively. The loans with interest rate 
of 9+4.25 should be given preference.  
3. Revenue generating securities should be 
preferred over idle securities.  
4. Borrowers whose property value lies in 
between 11-70lacs group should be sanctioned 
loan within 4-42lacs group. 
5. Interest rate, secondary finance and income 
should be given more weightage while 
sanctioning the loan.  
 
7. Managerial Implications 
The managerial implications of this study have 
been divided into three categories as borrower’s 
prospective, mortgage loan process and banker’s 
prospective.  
7.1 Borrower’s Prospective 
The borrower’s profile consists of age, marital 
status, gender education and income of borrower. 
This study has brought out clear picture of mortgage 
default and borrower’s profile. Gender of defaulters 
shows one sidedness towards male 94% which 
implies that female defaulters (only 6%) should be 
appreciated for loan as they don’t take more risk of 
defaulting compared to male borrowers. Income is 
another big factor which determines mortgage 
default. Banker and borrower should discuss the 
temporary problem and come up with a solution 
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which is acceptable to borrower. Banks should 
reduce the EMI and increase the tenure so that 
borrowers outflow can be reduced. Married 
borrowers are more defaulting compared to 
unmarried, which brings in concern that less amount 
of loan should be issued to aged people. In case of 
collection process RBI has issued clear guidelines 
that the collection agent cannot harass borrower 
mentally or physically, cannot call him/her at odd 
times, and banks are responsible for any misdeeds of 
recovery agents. Even RBI accepts that delay can 
occur in order to make payments by a genuine 
borrower. 
7.2 Mortgage loan process  
In order to minimize risk, lender should try to 
keep the LTV value as low as possible. If in case 
borrower is not able to repay loan, lender is at 
minimum risk because of low LTV value. Type of 
security also determines the risk of lender, as 
negative home equity is risk for lender. Lender 
should take that type of security where there is less 
chance of negative equity e.g. land has less chance of 
negative equity as compared to building. Banker 
should have discussion with borrower before going 
for sale of security. Higher interest rates (9+4.75%) 
have more default compared to lower rates 
(9+4.25%). If borrower’s interest rate is high, he/she 
should look for other options such as refinancing the 
loan from other banks, negotiating with your banks to 
reduce the interest rate. 
7.3 Banker’s Prospective 
 Non-performing loans that turn into bad debt or 
dead loans are a problem for banking industry. 
Before and during the execution of a loan agreement, 
the risk should be evaluated in order to reduce future 
defaults. These risks include the ability of the 
borrower to repay the loan, and the validity and 
enforceability of the guaranty. Based on the bank's 
analysis and evaluation of the potential risks, bank 
should decide whether to issue the loan. Here the 
amount repaid by borrower is dominated by 0-15lacs 
group. The value of mortgage shows that lower the 
mortgage value higher the defaults and vice versa. 
For the loans with guaranty such as mortgages and 
pledges, the mortgaged or pledged property may 
depreciate, so bank should maintain low LTV ratios. 
Low LTV ratios indicate minimum risk. Once there is 
a decision to issue the loan, the bank should 
minimize its own risk in the loan agreement by 
asking borrower to buy insurance. Borrower shall not 
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Table 1: Correlation test between borrower’s 
profile and outstanding balance 


































N 99 99 99 99 99 
**correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 2: Correlation test between Loan value 
contents and outstanding balance 
 
**correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Table 3: Correlation test between collateral 
security and outstanding balance 
























0.038 0 0.328 
.63
6 
N 99 99 99 99 
**correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
















































































































































































































































 Table 5: ANOVA 
 
 










1 69.620a .476 .643 




















Betwee 40211.97 1 40211.9
34.53
6 









Betwee 18838.45 1 18838.4
65.50
3 
.000 Within 27609.25 9 287.596 








Within 13393.05 9 139.511 





Betwee 30981.53 1 30981.5
41.37
4 
.000 Within 71886.82 9 748.821 
Total 102868.3 9   
LTV 
Betwee .157 1 .157 
13.47
1 
.000 Within 1.115 9 .012 
Total 1.272 9   















































N 99 99 99 99 99 99 
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0 35 5 87.5
1 10 49 83.1
Overall 
Percentage 





Table 8: Variables in the Equation 
Variables in the Equation 


































LTV 2.61 1.3 3.81 1 .0 13.7
EDU .377 .64 .341 1 .5 1.45
Interest - 1.5 2.50 1 .1 .090 
Loan -.915 .61 2.21 1 .1 .401
Purpose .684 .87 .608 1 .4 1.98






















































Figure 2: ROC Curve for values below average of 
Outstanding Balance 
 
 
 
